Religionism and Religious Education*
JOHN M. HULL
Leicester, Mal; Modgil,
Celia; Modgil, Sohan (eds.), Education, Culture and Values: Spiritual and
Religious Education, vol. 5, (London: Falmer Press, 2000), pp. 75-85.
I. Religionism
We do not appear to have a word in English which describes
that kind of religion which involves the identity of the believer in such a way
as to support tribalism and nationalistic solidarity through fostering negative
attitudes towards other religions. Elsewhere, I have suggested that the word religionism
should be used in this sense (Hull, 1992a; cf. Thompson, 1993; Cooling,
1994).
Wilfred Cantwell Smith studied this phenomenon nearly 50
years ago as it appeared in the late nineteenth and the first decades of the
twentieth centuries in the Indian subcontinent. Smith observed a process of
narrowing, in which many Indian Muslims no longer took much interest in Islam
as a worldwide movement but became preoccupied with the Muslim community in
India:
Muslim
communalists ... have been highly conscious of the Muslims within India as a
supposedly single, cohesive community, to which they devote their loyalty –
paying little attention to whether the individuals included are
religiously ardent, tepid, or cold; orthodox, liberal, or atheist; righteous or
vicious; or to whether they are landlord or peasant, prince or proletarian;
also paying little, attention to Muslims outside India. (Smith, 1946, p.
157)
In the Qur’án, men and women are called to respond to God with
reverence and obedience. The result of their obedience is Islam (Smith, 1976,
p. 68). Smith described how under the particular political, economic and social
pressures of Indian life, the goal of many Muslims became the well-being of the
Muslim community. Islam was no longer the result of obedience but the focus of
loyalty: ‘in today’s embattled world, men readily press their religion again
into the service not of its highest ideals but of the immediate interests of
their own group’ (Smith, 1946, p. 158). At the same time, membership of the
Muslim community was broadened to include many who had little or no
sense of the presence of God but were merely Muslims by descent, language or
kinship.
Similar trends were observed within the other religious
traditions of the sub-continent. Smith shows how Hinduism was a reified
creation of western scholarship, having its origins in the late nineteenth
century when European scholars were beginning to conceptualise the special
features of religious life in India (Smith, 1976, p. 66; 1981, p. 91). The
entity thus created, namely Hinduism, became in turn the object of
identification on the part of some of the people who belonged to that group of
traditions, who thus distinguished themselves more sharply as Hindus from
Muslims and Christians.
Smith described this process and its result as communalism,
since he wished to emphasise that religious faith became an instrument serving
the aggrandisement of a distinct community. Smith spoke of communalism
rather than merely ‘community spirit’ because he saw this process as
encouraging a sectarian and tribal spirit. Religious faith was the instrument
for the creation of this sense of particularity, but because it involved
a loss of universal vision, a lapse in the sense of the mission of the faith in
relation to the ultimate or transcendent God, this kind of religious
communalism was sharply criticised by the more sophisticated theologians in all
the affected religious traditions (Smith, l946, p.182).
By using the word religionism instead of Cantwell Smith’s
communalism, I wish to draw attention to the ideological content of tribalism,
in so far as tribalism uses religious believing as its vehicle. The word
religionism emphasises the religious character of this phenomenon, recognising
it nevertheless as a distorted form of religious faith. Rather than becoming
less religious, the phenomenon of religionism can be thought of as making
people more religious, more zealously committed to their religion and opposed to
the religion of others. The communalist movements, both within Hinduism and
Islam, which glamorised their religious past and were accompanied by a kind of
religio-national mysticism, were not in their early stages specifically
anti-Muslim or anti-Hindu. They were just enthusiastically Muslim,
enthusiastically Hindu:
As
yet, it did not involve inter-communal antagonism and hatred, but simply
distinction. It has slowly developed since then, encouraged by a constant
interplay of developing political and economic and religious processes, into
the furious rivalry of the present day. (Smith, 1946, p. 169)
In emphasising the ideological character of religion, the
expression religionism also focuses attention upon certain aspects of religious
belief or doctrine which are particularly conducive[1]
to the formation of such sectarian and tribal solidarities.
Religionism, however, should not be regarded as a
consequence of religion. It is, rather, a form of religion, exhibiting the
entire structure of religion: worship, ethics, myth, doctrine and so on. We may
describe it as a misappropriation of religion, as a religious deviation or
distortion, but such expressions are evaluative, not phenomenological.
Religious identity and
religionism
The identity which is fostered by religionism depends upon
rejection and exclusion.[2]
We are better than they. We are orthodox; they are infidels. We are believers;
they are unbelievers. We are right; they are wrong. The other is identified as
the pagan, the heathen, the alien, the stranger, the invader, the one who
threatens us and our way of life, and in contrast to whom we know what we are.
Eric H. Erikson (1964, p. 82; 1968, p. 80) distinguished
between the identity of wholeness which is inclusive, and that of totalism
which is exclusive. The identity of totalism says that I am an adult just in so
far as I am not a child. I exclude my childhood. I am not a child but an adult.
The identity of wholeness claims that my adulthood is all the more mature
inasmuch as I acknowledge and affirm the childhood of my past and the child who
is still within me. I am an adult in so far as I comprehend my whole life, past
and future.
Although total identity formation may occur during the
adolescent years as a defensive reaction against identity confusion, it may
take a more malignant form if it appears during adulthood. During the crisis of
intimacy versus isolation, characteristic of early adulthood, a strong and
wholesome identity enables one to risk the vulnerability and fusion of intimacy
with the other, whereas totalistic identity tends to reject otherness, finding
intimacy only with that which is already similar to the self. Thus the path to
generativity, the pouring out of oneself in caring for others, is blocked and
the fifth Eriksonian stage (generativity versus stagnation) cannot be
successfully encountered (Erikson, 1963a, pp. 255ff.; 1968, pp. 135ff.).
Under certain circumstances human groups affirm a totalistic
identity which is dangerous because of the clannish loyalties which it creates.
Erikson interpreted this phenomenon in biological terms, speaking of
‘pseudo-speciation’ (Erikson, 1963b, pp. 1-28; 1975, pp. 176-9). So general are
human beings that the human itself is too amorphous to be imagined as a focus
for identity. It is as if a species-wide identification demands too much
empathy, too much abstraction for most people. Closer and more precise
definition of the human is looked for, where characteristics such as mother
tongue, skin colour or gender become the point of identification. The group
thus created becomes a sort of sub-species. It competes with other subspecies
for land and for resources.
Whereas pseudo-speciation reduces plurality by establishing
a homogeneous group, recent studies in the theory of identity emphasise the
plurality and flexibility of identity. Identity should be thought of not so
much as a substance or essence which is of a certain fixed kind but as the
product of a narrative, a story or series of stories which are used to
interpret my experience and my place with others in the world (Meijer, 1991,
1995). When religion feeds pseudo-speciation, we may call it religionism.
Erikson was aware that the symbols and traditions of religion could support and
even generate such sub-speciation or tribalism. On the other hand, the great
world faiths also contain universal and transcendent elements which may enable
human faith to achieve a wider and even a cosmic loyality (Erikson, 1958, p.
264; 1969, PP. 431-3).
Religionism and religious prejudice
Religionism always involves prejudice against other
religions and other religious people. The expression ‘religious prejudice’ is
not, however, sufficient to describe the phenomenon in question, because a prejudice
is merely a psychological matter.
There is a distinction between racism and racial prejudice.
Racism may exist in institutions where individuals are unaware of personal
racial prejudice. Racism may be built up in historical experience, in economic
structures and in political life. Thus there is a sociology, a history and a
politics of racism as well as a psychology. Racism cannot be understood as a
mere attitude, although racist attitudes remain a very important part of
racism.
It is much the same with religionism. Religionism may
develop slowly over centuries. It may be expressed in institutional form; it
may mould the mythology of a people and thus become embedded in the culture of
opposing peoples. Religionism falls like a shadow upon the hearts and minds of
individuals and it may then be experienced as religious prejudice but its
structures go beyond the individual. There may be religionist tendencies in the
orthodox structure of theological systems. Believers participating uncritically
in these theological systems may have certain beliefs about others and their
religions, but it will not occur to them that these beliefs generate and
perpetuate prejudice. The beliefs about others will simply be accepted as being
true. The identity of the believer is conferred by the religious tradition, and
if that identity is total, being sustained by negative perceptions of others
and their religions, this may all be received as part of what salvation means.
Origins of religionism
For various complex reasons, it seemed to be
difficult for some religions to evolve without taking on religionist
tendencies: ‘Every major ideological movement, religious and not, has begun
with a rejecting of the others. This stage is passing’ (Smith, l98l, p. 122).
Christianity had already assumed a religionist attitude
towards Judaism before the close of the New Testament period, and this was
entrenched by the second century (see Reuther 1975; Dunn, 1991). Islam took on
religionist features as it emerged from both Christianity and Judaism.
Protestantism gathered religionist features during its early struggles with
Roman Catholicism. When reforming movements encounter opposition, they attack
in order to defend themselves. It must also be realised that inasmuch as new
religious movements often take the form of a reforming reaction against the
decadence of the surrounding religious life, there may be an attack upon this
decadence. Such attacks are not necessarily to be regarded as religionist
unless they feed an exclusive identity on the part of the attacker. They may be
thought of as ethical protest. Before long, however, the new community may be
struggling to maintain its identity. Caricature and stereotype are soon adopted
as techniques in this competition for survival. The hearts and minds of the
second generation are nurtured within an identity-protecting cocoon, the outer
rim of which is hardened by such stereotypes. So religious reform turns into
religionism, and the proclamation of the good news to the poor acquires the
features of religionistic evangelism.
Religionistic evangelism is not quite the same as
proselytising evangelism. There is a market place of ideas, and where there is
choice, there is competition. Describing the missionary activity of the early Christians,
Karl Jost (1975, p. 51) speaks of ‘the sense of competition which developed as
they spread their faith. Knowledge now had a moral competitive cast and numbers
converted took on importance.’ Such evangelism only becomes religionistic if it
includes a polemic against other religions which is calculated not so much
to convert the others as to build up the exclusive identity of those already
converted. There are good and bad reasons for adopting a religion; the
promulgation of these ideas is not per se to fall into religionism. At the same
time, the identity built up by religionism need not necessarily be of an ethnic
kind. Jost shows that the Christian movement, like the other international
religions of the Graeco-Roman world was explicitly trans-ethnic (ibid., pp.
50-2; see also Legge, 1964). Often, however, modern religionism is regressive
in that it revives the pre-Christian and primal association between
individual and collective identity.
As the theological world view of the new movement becomes
more articulate, elements of religionism acquire doctrinal significance and are
built into the orthodox system. When this point is reached, deconstruction will
be resisted in the name of the integrity of the religion itself. When it
becomes the ideology of imperialism, such a theology will play a role in
justifying the exploitation and enslavement of those who are regarded as
pagans, heathens or as being without souls. For example, the doctrine of the
metaphysical and exclusive uniqueness of Christian salvation has been used
to
make Christians feel uniquely privileged in contrast to the non-Christian
majority of the human race, and accordingly free to patronise them religiously,
exploit them economically, and dominate them politically. Thus the dogma of the
deity of Christ – in conjunction with the aggressive arid predatory aspect of
human nature – has contributed
historically to the evils of colonialism. (Hick, 1989, pp. 371-2)
It
is perhaps an epistemic condition of religious faith that the saving religion should
be experienced as uniquely true and precious, but it is not an epistemic
condition of saving faith that the saving faith of others should be denied a
similar status. The standard techniques of self-deception, namely
compartmentalisation, selective reading of the evidence, displacement and
projection, are used to maintain religionism in the service of the weakened
ego, which appears unable to face the threat of its inclusion within a wider
humanity.
Religionism and politics
Cantwell Smith showed how it became part of British policy
to maintain and even to encourage communalism in India during the early decades
of the twentieth century. It was helpful to the Raj that the subjected peoples
should be divided into many separate groups, and then it became possible fur
the imperial administration to portray itself as the even hand of justice and
moderation, mediating between the warring parties:
The
Government’s method of encouraging communalism has been to approach all
political subjects, and as many other subjects as possible, on a communalist
basis; and to encourage, even to insist upon, everyone else’s doing likewise.
(Smith, l946, p. 180)
Above all, it was in the
British press at home that the strikes and riots which occurred in India were
portrayed as being religionist in character. They had nothing to do with
economics or with the desire for national liberty; they were sectarian
conflicts between Hindu and Muslim (ibid., p. 175).
With the growing ethnic and religious pluralism of Britain since
the Second World War, the emergence of domestic religionism has become a
reality in the United Kingdom. Significant traces of religionism may be found
in the relationships between the Church of England, the Free Churches and the
Roman Catholics in Britain from the sixteenth to the nineteenth centuries, but
on the whole the first 80 years of the twentieth century may be looked upon as
a period when religionism was at a low ebb in Britain, although it was actively
promulgated abroad, as we have seen. The rise of the ecumenical movement was
one of many factors contributing to the greater degree of understanding and
mutual respect between Christian denominations during this period. The agreed
syllabus of religious education in England and Wales from the mid-1920s until
the end of the 1980s may be considered as a fruit of such mutual understanding.
The conservative resurgence of the 1980s and early 1990s brought with it a
revival of religionism. In the remainder of this chapter I shall illustrate
this unfortunate tendency with respect to religious education and I shall
propose an antidote.
II Religionism in
Religious Education
The resurgence of religionism in British religious education
was accompanied by a rhetoric which made use of three positive concepts and one
negative one, The positive concepts were those of integrity, predominance and
cultural heritage (Hull, 1993). The negative concept was that of a mishmash.[3]
In the rhetorical order, the negative normally came first. The country was
warned that instead of receiving a clear instruction about Christianity and
other important religions, children were being given a mishmash, that is, a
superficial and confusing mixture of ingredients taken from various religions,
presented out of’ context, leading to a trivialisation of faith. Next, the
rhetoric proposed to clarify this mess by unmixing religions. At this point the
positive concepts and images came into play. The integrity of each religious
tradition would be restored and respected. Religions would neither be confused
with each other nor contaminated nor diluted by contact but each would be
presented separately, one by one. In this way the purity and coherence of each
religion would be restored.
Once this separation had been achieved, the third step in
the rhetoric was to argue that children could not be expected to assimilate
more than a limited number of these religious systems. Christianity would
obviously always be one, and thus Christianity would predominate. In order to
secure this predominance, the balance between Christianity and other religions
would he carefully monitored. This was often expressed in statistical terms
(see Brown, 1994, p. 5). A stated percentage of the curriculum should be
devoted to Christianity. The recommended percentage varied from 50 per cent to
75 per cent. The remaining time should be devoted to the study of the other
religions, on a limited basis. It was claimed that this would be sufficient for
one or two other religions at the appropriate key stage to be taught ‘properly
and at sufficient depth to be treated with the respect and intellectual
integrity they require’ (ibid.).
Finally, having passed through its denunciatory stage
(mishmash) and announced the restoration of religious integrity, the preponderance
of Christianity was justified by appeal to the British cultural heritage: ‘The
legislation governing religious education and worship in such schools is
designed in RE to ensure that pupils gain . . . a thorough knowledge of
Christianity reflecting the Christian heritage of the country’ (DfE, 1994,
para. 7). It thus became apparent that the interest was not so much in
Christianity as a world-wide mission or movement but in the integrity of the
traditional religion of Britain. Britain was to he understood not as a
multicultural society hut as containing a limited amount of ethnic diversity,
mainly confined to the large cities.
A few examples will enable the reader to sense the tone of
the rhetoric:
Many
of our children are in schools where they are denied the experience of
religious worship at all and where teaching about Christianity has either been
diluted to a multi-faith relativism or has become little more than a
secularised discussion of social and political issues. (Cox, 1988, p.4)
many
of the Agreed Syllabuses and the new GCSE Religious Education examinations have
failed to enshrine the centrality of Christianity. Indeed, the opposite is
often true: Christianity is submerged in a welter of shallow dabblings in a
variety of other religions, resulting in a confusing kaleidoscope of images of
faiths, doing justice to none. (Ibid.)
This was described as ‘the
debasement of Christianity in our schools’.
Of
course, they can and must be given some understanding and knowledge of other
major world religions, but this does not mean that we should jettison our
responsibility to provide Christian worship and the study of Christianity as
the major faith of this land. (Ibid., p. 5)
John Burn and Cohn Hart
(1988, p. 5) quoted a speech by Robert Kilroy-Silk in which he referred to ‘the
fashionable but meaningless multi-race creed . . . an artificially created
mongrel’ (The Times 8 April 1988).
A typical feature of rising religionism is to count how many
representatives on a certain committee each religion might have. So Burn and
Hart (1988) told us that on the agreed syllabus conference which created the
Brent syllabus of 1985 there were fifteen representatives of religions other
than Christianity on the 23-person ‘other denominations’ group. The
corresponding committee in Manchester had 23 non-Christians and twenty-two
Christians (ibid., p. 16). The implication was that Christians were being
submerged, losing control, being overwhelmed. Unless the law was changed, it
would ‘condemn children living in certain boroughs to learn little of the
Christian faith’ (ibid., pp. 23f). Burn and Hart called upon Parliament to
‘amend the present Education Reform Bill in such a way that Religious
Instruction is defined as being predominantly the study of the Christian
religion’. The law should set up ‘machinery . . . to ensure the creation of
national guidelines for predominantly Christian religious education’. The
‘other denominations’ committee of the agreed syllabus conference ‘should be
made up of members of Christian denominations other than the Church of England’
(ibid., p. 29). Representatives of the other religions were to be excluded.
A characteristic of the British literature of religionism is
that other religions are seldom if ever attacked directly. We might be told, as
in the previous example, that on a certain committee there are 22 Christians
and 23 non-Christians. We are not told why this matters, or who bothered to do
the counting. Everything is by innuendo. The explicit attacks are reserved for
humanism, atheism and communism. The other religions are always spoken of with
respect, but they must keep their distance and they must know their place. They
must he separate from Christianity and from each other, because only in this
way can their proper place be estimated. Separation makes it possible to count,
and then proportions can be reckoned.[4]
Only in this way can a preponderance of Christianity he guaranteed. Although
official language towards the other faiths remains courteous at all times, the
actual implication of the policy, the meaning behind the words, became clearer
each year.
From the point of view of the religionists, the water was
muddied rather than clarified by the Education Reform Act (ERA) 1988 s. 8(3).
Whereas it had been hoped that the agreed syllabuses would have been
predominantly Christian, a compromising form of words was presented to the
House of Lords by the then Bishop of London, Dr Graham Leonard, to which the
Christian religionists reluctantly agreed (Hansard, House of Lords, 21
June 1988, col. 639; Hull, 1991, p. 19). This required new agreed syllabuses
not only to ‘reflect the fact that the principal religious traditions in Great
Britain are in the main Christian’ but also to ‘take account of the teaching
and practices of the other principal religions represented in Great Britain’
(Education Reform Act 1988 s. 8(3)).
It had become clear that this form of words was little more
than a description and thus a confirmation of the general approach of the
agreed syllabuses throughout the preceding two decades, and that the new law
could be interpreted as requiring the teaching of a world religions syllabus.
The expression ‘shall reflect’ could be interpreted in many ways and several
different kinds of syllabus might be compatible with this requirement.[5]
In spite of this, Christian religionism refused to give up.
It was insisted that unless an agreed syllabus was clearly divided between the
various religions, system by system, in such a way as to guarantee Christian
preponderance at all stages of schooling, the so-called requirements of the Act
were not being fully met. Attempts were made to bring the Local Education
Authorities, which have the responsibility for syllabuses, into line, but these
had little effect.
A fresh attempt was made in 1993 to marginalise the other
world faiths but with one or two exceptions these attempts failed. The press
sensed the atmosphere with the headline ‘Tory Christians lose faith battle’ (The
Times Educational Supplement 14 May 1993). Indeed, the Christian
religionists seemed to welcome the military metaphors. Lady Olga Maitland,
commenting on the model syllabuses, said: ‘Christianity is once again fighting
for survival in the school room. This is no novelty; wars have been waged for
centuries over religious tolerance. The fight is going on ... this has become
another battle ground ... A mishmash of multiculturalism has crept into RE’ (Education
14 January 1994, p. 32).
The DfE Circular 1/94 gave the official government
interpretation of the religious education and collective worship legislation.
School children were to be given ‘a thorough knowledge of Christianity
reflecting the Christian heritage of this country’ and a less-thorough
‘knowledge of the other principal religions represented in Great Britain’ (DfE,
1994, para. 7). This distinction between the heritage religion and the
represented religions marked a new stage in the development of religionism. The
heritage which was of interest to the government was only the predominant one:
‘Religious education in schools should seek to develop pupils’ knowledge,
understanding and awareness of Christianity, as the predominant religion in
Great Britain’ (ibid., para. 16). Judaism, in spite of its centuries-old
tradition in Britain, was not to be part of this country’s heritage. Judaism
is, presumably, only represented in this country. Represented religions have no
real home here.
The distinction between being the heritage and being
represented applied not only to the content of what was studied in religious
education but also to the children themselves. Collective worship was given a
much stronger Christian theological profile such that it became impossible for
children from Muslim, Jewish and other traditions to take part in the
collective assembly. The expectation was that schools would make applications
for part- determinations which would enable Muslim pupils to worship as a
single religious group. Similar part- determinations would follow for pupils
from other religious groups.[6]
The connection between collective worship, religionism and
communalism is particularly striking. Let us take the case of Crowcroft Park
Primary School in Manchester. A small group of parents protested about the
collective worship offered by the school, on the grounds that it was not
distinctively Christian but included some elements from the other spiritual traditions
represented in the school (Manchester City Council, 1991, p. 12). The Secretary
of State supported the LEA in dismissing the complaint, pointing out that
section 7 of ERA 1988 quite clearly permits collective worship to be wholly or mainly
of a broadly Christian character: that is, non-Christian children could
take part and elements from various religions could be included.[7]
Thus the attempt to purify collective worship, which would have divided
children on religious grounds, failed. It is interesting, however, to realise
that the complaint from these parents did not begin with questions of worship
and religious education, but with the exposure of their children to
foreign food served in the school cafeteria. There were also protests about the
children being exposed (a favourite word) to Asian languages (ibid., p. 6).
These complaints had already been dismissed by the LEA before being revived
under a different guise by the passage of the ERA in 1988. New possibilities
were then presented for stirring up ethnocentrism and xenophobia, made all the
more powerful by the religious context.
A somewhat similar incident took place in two Birmingham
inner-ring primary schools. A group of Muslim enthusiasts protested that
although what the schools were actually doing in collective worship was
unobjectionable it was nevertheless the case that in law Muslim children were
being treated as if they were engaged in Christian worship. This objection was
understandable and indicated an important sense in which the 1988 legislation
is divisive, since it clearly distinguishes between families on religious
grounds. Of course, the legislation makes provision for groups other than
Christian. An application can he made on their behalf for a part-determination
which, as we have seen, would enable them to worship in a manner which was
wholly or mainly of a broadly Islamic character. Instead of seeking a
part-determination, however, one of’ the schools made a successful application
for a whole-determination. This had the effect of lifting the requirements for
section 7 (that is, Christian worship) entirely, such that no pupil would be
treated as belonging to a specific religious tradition, and the natural
sensitivity about Muslim children being treated as if they were Christians was
removed.
The Muslim enthusiasts were, however, not satisfied with
this response. They insisted upon a part-determination and refused to
accept a whole-determination. It is natural that Muslims should argue that when
Christian children have ‘their own act of worship’ Muslim children should also
have their own. But when no child is being treated as a member of a religious
tradition but all children are being treated as children attending the school
for the purpose of their education, and all are invited to attend and take part
in a ceremony of collective worship which will draw upon all the spiritual
traditions represented in the school, the case collapses. This particular group
of Muslims did not want Muslim children to take part in the common and ordinary
collective spiritual life of the school. Other indications from the area
suggested that this was part of a general programme of heightening religious
sensitivity, including community and po1itical awareness which was clearly
religionist in character. It was significant that in the school in question the
Muslim parents who wanted a separate Muslim assembly were drawn from one ethnic
group. Other ethnic groups, although equally devout Muslims, were happy with
the collective worship of the whole school.[8]
One must be sympathetic towards Muslim religionism in
Britain, since to a large extent it is the response of a proud and cultivated
people to the indignities and marginalisations which they have experienced.
When Christians claim to predominate, Muslims will naturally seek to find at
least some ground where they also can predominate. As Cantwell Smith (1946, p.
170) remarked so many years ago, religionism is ‘like a habit-forming
drug, which, as long as it is administered, is needed in ever increasing
doses’. Religionism characteristically creates a spiral of escalating tension.
It is easy to whip it up; it is extraordinarily difficult to calm it down.
Draft versions of the model religious education syllabuses
prepared by the School Curriculum and Assessment Authority (SCAA) were
published for consultation on 25 January 1994. These were consistent with the
religionist policy which we have been tracing, it was assumed that the
legislation only permits one kind of syllabus: that in which religions are to
be taught as coherent entities one by one in complete separation. The
separatist claim was quite explicit, since the introductory booklet argued that
an approach to understanding religion which drew upon more than one religious
tradition was unacceptable (SCAA, 1994, p. 5).[9]
It was interesting that the statements (required by the DfE) of percentages to
be devoted to Christianity and the other religions were to be withdrawn,
following advice from the legal branch that the law did not require or even
permit such percentage indications,[10]
but when the working party withdrew not only the percentages but the diagrams
indicating visually the proportions to be devoted to different religions, this
diagram was instantly replaced by direct authority of the Minister involved.[11]
It is not surprising that the representatives of the Hindu,
Jewish, Sikh, Muslim and Buddhist traditions were disappointed and offended.
They were being marginalised, and they knew it.’[12]
The sad thing is that for years, for decades, religious education syllabuses
had given a prominent position to the Christian faith while allowing for a less
prominent place for the other religions, and every- one was more or less happy.
That was because the atmosphere in those days was not religionist. Nobody
bothered to count how many Buddhists or Sikhs were on a committee. It never
occurred to the Muslims and Hindus that Christians were trying to dominate. The
thinking was educational, not religionist.
In contrast, the model syllabuses were set tip from the
beginning in the wrong way. A group of Christians was invited to draw up a Christianity
syllabus; a group of Muslims did a similar job for Islam
and so on. Right from the start, people involved in an educational project were
invited to think of themselves as primarily members of a particular
religious community. The result was predictable, and presumably well
planned.[13]
An alternative strategy, which would not have yielded a
religionist result, would have been for a committee comprising people
from various religions and perhaps some of no religion, including
teachers and educators, to draw up a syllabus indicating the best possible
religious educational experience for children in British schools today. Indeed,
several such groups could have been established, and a variety of approaches
might have been generated. All this could have been published, and the variety
and freedom permitted by the law would thus have been reinforced. The local
creators of agreed syllabuses would thus have had plenty of
inspiration and various examples. Instead, a separatist
approach which insisted upon its own supremacy was created, with clear religionist
implications for the future. Fortunately, the model syllabuses only have
advisory status. The religionist pressures come mainly from the top, as is to
be expected in what is ‘quite clearly a part of the ideological superstructure
of British political and social power,[14]
but at the local level we may hope that the human realities of
making contact will overcome the desire for a purified integrity.
III Anti-religionist
education
Just as anti-sexist
and anti-racist educational programmes seek to combat sexism and
racism, we need to create an anti-religionist education. This should be
provided not only in school religious education hut as part of the adult
education programmes in every church and parish. every mosque and synagogue.
Speaking from within the Christian faith, it is clear that Christian education
should be evaluated as to its faithfulness not merely to the
Christian tradition but to the Christian mission. In other words, what matters
is not an exact transmission of the tradition hut an encounter with the vision
which the tradition represents, the purpose of God in reconciling human beings
in Jesus Christ. That purpose was not just reconciliation with God, but
reconciliation between human individuals and groups. Christ
is our peace, who has broken down the barrier which
divides us and is making of all people one new humanity (Ephesians
2: 14f). Any religionist tendencies which the Christian tradition might
possess should be overcome in the name of the Holy Spirit who is still
revealing new things through the old things (John 16: 12f.).
The anti-relionist
curriculum. Strand 1:
deconstruction
This task cannot be accomplished inerd’ through encouraging
tolerance of other religions. Even the religionists speak of tolerance and
respect towards other religions, although their actions belie their claims. It
is necessary to realise that the Christian religion has acquired intolerant
elements and that therefore a deconstruction is necessary.
The experience of the early
Christians was that they entered into peace with God through the Lord Jesus
Christ. In reporting that this experience was to be found only through Jesus
Christ, the Christians were not making comments about Buddhism and Hinduism, of
which they knew nothing, nor about Islam or Sikhism, which had not as yet
entered the world (Smith, 1981, p. 171). As for Judaism, it was clear that the
great prophets and law givers of the Hebrew Bible walked in peace with God. The
Christians had experienced salvation only through Jesus Christ and this is
exactly what they said. We misunderstand their spirit of love and peace iii
Christ when we apply their insights to our modern pluralist and competitive
religious world, turning the grace of God to which they are witnesses into a
religious system through which we weak little people find powerful identities.
God has no pets, and as Juan Luis Segundo (1973, pp. 40-4)
has shown, it is a great responsibility to be called to participate in
the world-wide mission of God through Christ. There are thus
responsibilities in being Christian; it is less clear that there are
advantages. Such advantages would instantly tribalise humanity. The important
distinctions recognised by the Kingdom of God do not lie between one religious
system and another but between the rich and the poor. It is God’s intention to
fill the hungry with good things and to send the rich away empty. We have no
warrant within the grace of God for claiming that it is God’s intention to fill
the Christians with good things and to send the non-Christians away empty. This
is not the way of God.
Just as anti-racist education goes beyond the question of
racial prejudice, so anti-religionist education must go beyond the mere
encouragement of tolerance. Two elements in the syllabus may be expected. First,
the systems approach should certainly continue, that is, the presentation of
religious traditions one by one. However, critical methods of
interpretation will help both children and adults to distinguish the salvific
from the religionist elements in the Bible, the history of doctrine and
present-day Christian experience.
This may be described as the deconstructionist requirement.
Moreover, although deconstruction is in a sense an internal matter the each
religious tradition and thus requires a more or less systematic exposition from
within that tradition, it cannot be conducted in isolation from other
traditions. Recognition of this will restore a good deal of reality to the way
the religious traditions are treated .After all, no religion came into the world
in isolation. Every religious tradition was born into a world already full of
religions and has evolved in a continual dialogue with one or several other
religions. This pattern of coexistence and mutual influence has differed in,
let us say, China on the one hand and the Middle East on the other, but it has
always been in a context of relationships.[15]
The result of this interchange is seen not only in the frequent
borrowings between traditions (for 1000 years the Buddha had a place in
Christian hagiography) (Smith, 1981, pp. 7ff.) but will affect what are
sometimes called the core elements. The medieval Christian doctrine of God drew
upon the Iberian theological melting-pot where Jewish, Muslim and Christian
theologians were in contact with each other. Christian eschatology evolved
under the influence of Zoroastrianism and today hundreds of new Christian
denominations are being formed, particularly in Africa and in South America,
which draw upon primal religious traditions and folk knowledge. If we were to
think not so much in terms of Christianity as an absolute and unqualified
essence but of participating in the influence and the inspiration offered by
Jesus, we would come closer to the nature of Christian discipleship.
The anti-religionist
curriculum. Strand 2:
universalising faith
The second strand in an anti-religionist curriculum will
consist of the study of the religious experience of men and women in a global
perspective. We know today what God, presumably, has always known about us:
that our religious history as a species is ultimately one and indivisible. There
is a world-wide history of religious consciousness. Each religious tradition is
more richly understood within that global context. Thus an important object of
religious education is religion itself nor just the religious traditions, hut
the religious sensitivity which millions of men and women, boys and girls,
still possess, whether within a particular so called tradition or completely
outside it. What matters in religious education today is not only what
happened in the formation of the religious experience of humanity, that is, the
religious past, hut what is happening today to the descendants of the men and
women who made those traditions: that is, all of us. How are human beings today
to respond to that to which the spirituality of all religions hears witness?
This kind of study involves
inter-religious and trans-religious topics treated from a dialogical
perspective. As the connections between religion and conflict seem in so many
ways to be getting stronger today, it is the task of religious
educators, whatever their faith background or lack of it, to contribute to this
anti-religionist enterprise. In this way religious education can play its part
in the liberation of religions and could make a valuable contribution to peace
and reconciliation.
* Based on a paper delivered to the International Conference on Religion and Conflict held in Armagh, Northern Ireland, 20-21 May 1994. I am grateful to the St Peters College Saltley Trust in Birmingham whose grant enabled this paper to be revised and prepared for the present publication.
[1] Contrary to Barnes (1997), I do not believe that religionism can be inferred directly from a religious doctrine, although religious doctrines may permit or support religionism in varying degrees. I have discussed the relationship between Christian doctrines and religionism in my lecture The Holy Trinity and Christian Education in a Pluralist World (Hull, 1995a).
[2] I have discussed the characteristics of such an identity in a case study approach in Hull (1996).
[3] The same concept, that of a mixture of disgusting or ill-assorted foods, may also appear as hotch potch, mess of pottage and so on. I have discussed this rhetoric in Hull (1991).
[4] A typical example of the desire to count so that proportions can be so arranged as to secure the marginalisation of the smaller religious groups is found in the 1993 Education Act: “The numbers of representatives of each denomination and religion are required to reflect broadly the proportionate strength of that denomination or religion in the local area’ (Circular l/94, para. 111).
[5] It is interesting to note that the legal opinion obtained by the Secretary of State for Education dated 12 June 1990 in connection with the complaint received against the recently published agreed syllabuses of’ the London Boroughs of Ealing and Newham confirms this: ‘The fact that the religious traditions in Great Britain are in the main Christian could be reflected by devoting most rime to Christian traditions but in my opinion the flexibility inherent in the word “reflect” means that this could be done in other ways e.g. by comparison with other religions and discussion as to the differences and similarities between Christian and other traditions’ ( § 9.5). Unfortunately this crucial passage was omitted in the letter of guidance which the then DES sent to Chief Education Officers on 18 March 1991, and the government persisted with its policy of a narrow interpretation of the law, contrary to its own legal advice and in spite of the deterioration of relations between religious communities which inevitably followed. Such a policy, in the context of debate which I have described, was dearly a manifestation of religionism.
[6] I have discussed the implications of Circular 1/94 regarding collective worship in Hull (1995b; 1995c).
[7] Letter from the Secretary of State for Education, 23 June 1992. Mr Justice McCullough in rejecting a appeal for a judicial review against the ruling of the Secretary of State provided a very fine summary of the case and of the law on 26 February 1993.
[8] ‘Religious row at crisis point’. Metro News (Birmingham, 5 May 1994.
[9] The introductory document urges use educational grounds against syllabuses which draw upon several religions. The authors do not claim that the law would prohibit such syllabuses, since it had been clear ever since the legal ads ice of 12 June 1990 that this was not the case (note 5 above). The SCAA, following guidance from the government did not see fit to commend the range of syllabuses which the law permits.
[10] Letter from Rosemary D. Pearce, Schools 3 Branch of the DfE, 28 October 1993, to Barbara Wintersgill of SCAA.
[11] An account of the events was given in a letter from the Methodist representative on the SCAA Model RE Agreed Syllabuses Monitoring Group, the Reverend Geoff Robson, in his letter of protest to Mr Patten, the Secretary of State for Education, 11 January 1994. The bar chart itself appears on page 6 of the Introduction.
[12] ‘RE syllabus attacked for Christian bias’, Guardian, 25 January 1994, p. 8; ‘Call for balance in religious education’, Independent, 25 January 1994, p. 6; and ‘Faiths unite against new emphasis in RE’, The Times, 25 January 1994, p. 2.
[13] The background is provided in SCAA, Model Syllabuses: Faith Communities’ Working Group Reports 1994, where members of the working groups are also listed (pp. 35-6).
[14] I have discussed something of this background in Hull (1992b).
[15] See the general approach suggested
by the various contributors to Hick and Askari (1985).
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